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AN ANALYSIS OF THE TRADE REGIME IN KENYA. 
By 
Bernard Mbui Wagacha 
ABSTRACT: 
Certain developments in international trade have made it inevitable 
for LDCs to commence import-substituting industrialization. The measures 
used to intervene in trade for this purpose have resulted in certain factor 
and commodity price distortions in the domestic economies of LDCs, giving 
rise to resource allocational and income distribution effects which are not 
often appreciated. Tariffs quantitative restrictions, import duty drawbacks 
on inputs as well as administrative controls are shown to have been widely 
used in Kenya to promote industrialization and exports. Different combina-
tions of these policies have different effects on income distributions resource 
allocation and profits. The effects are further complicated by imperfections 
in import-substituting industries. Certain measures are proposed for more 
efficient combinations of the policies in the face of imperfections. 
IDS/WP 281 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE TRADE REGIME IN KENYA.: . • • 
This study proposes methods of examining Kenya's trade policies 
and follows through to see whether these policies have exerted the intended 
or other unintended effects on the economy. It is symptomatic of the 
economies of most less developed countries, (LDCs), that a significant 
proportion of their GNPs is dependent on external trade. This is in contrast 
with most industrial countries such as the U.S.A. where the proportion of 
the CNP generated through the foreign sector in less than 20 per cent. This 
smallness of the foreign sector cushions the economy from external instabili-
ties 
Yet it is not the greater dependence on trade from which LDCs 
suffer disadvantage and which makes the selected trade policies so crucial 
to economic development. At a time like the present, the prices of the 
commodities ih which LDCs trade are on a sharp upturn, with the price of coffee 
already higher than ever recorded."'' The improvement in commodity prices 
is in response to world industrial recovery after a downturn in the business 
cycle. When the boom busts the prices of the same commodities will take a 
dip, pulling the GNPs of the exporting countries in the same direction. 
The instabilities emanating from this feast-and-famine cycle of 
commodity prices constitutes the most acute disadvantage of LDCs dependence • 
on trade. Most LDCs rely on a small number of primary exportables for a 
large proportion of their foreign exchange earnings. The cyclical price . 
movements, together with the observation that rising incomes historically 
accompany an increasing proportional allocation of incomes to manufactures 
have pre-empted LDCs enthusiasm for the well known benefits of free trade 
policy. Moreover, it has long been argued (against other academic counter 
arguments,) that the real value of primary exportables secularly declines in 
international markets against the value of exportable industrial products., 
This is the terms of trade debate. Worsening terms of trade, together with 
the recurring price adversities faced by primary commodities in trade have 
led to chronic balance of payments problems in LDCs. 
To counter the balance of payments problems, most countries.have 
erected home production of imports of certain commodities, and applied other 
measures to enhance domestic import-competing production. The measures applied 
1 See the Economist 4-10 Sept. 1976. 
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have been discriminatory against other sectors of the economy such as 
agriculture and exporting sectors. Terms of trade and income distribution 
have turned against these sectors as import substituting industrialization 
proceeded. Measures to counteract the adverse effects of tariff protected 
import-substituting industrialization have been devised and applied to the 
affected sectors, particularly the exporting sector. But the full implications 
of these often hapharzardly applied measures are not appreciated. 
In the first post of this paper we relate the above problems to 
the mechanisms applied by LDCs in trade intervention. The second part relates 
Kenya's experience in the application of these measures. Thirdly, proposed 
methods of measuring these effects are set forth and, where the analyses 
show the measures to have adverse effects on the economy as a whole, guide-
lines for economic policy are considered with a view to making the trade 
intervention measures more efficient and less costly for the economy. 
I 
It is well known from the theory of international trade that inter-
ventions by trading partners substract from optimal world welfare. The fore-
gone optimality benefits, however, are obtainable through free trade policy 
only under certain rather restrictive conditions. There is no reason to think 
that if these conditions exist in MDCs they also exist in LDCs. Under monopoly 
power in trade, a country can persue a policy of export promotion aimed at 
reaping monopoly profits and this can be termed a proper policy. 
The literature on free trade conditions and policy is extensive, and 
we avoid repetition here. It is enough to observe that the principles of free 
trade abstract from income distribution of free-trade-generated world welfare 
benefits. Academic critics of LDC trade policies articulate the relative 
quantities of commodities produced for given resource inputs, (Ricardo's 
principle of comparative advantage,) or the quantities of domestic factors 
absorbed in the production of commodities, (the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson theorem). 
The latter theorem implies that a labor-abundant country, for example, trades 
in labor intensive commodities. This analysis places the pre-trade partners 
on points along their product transformation curves where the domestic marginal 
rates of substitution, DRS are equalized with the domestic rates of transforma-
tion, DRT. Yet the reality, not to be gainsaid, is that all trading partners 
do not share this horizontal correspondence in development. 
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Vertical differences in development play a role in giving a 
;,shrunken in'' shapre to the transformation curves of LDCs whose factor 
markets are distorted. It has been shown theoretically by Hagen (1958) that 
where distortions of this kind appear as a result of a wage differential 
between the import competing sector and other sectors, a case arises where 
a combined tariff on imports and a subsidy on import competing production will 
firstly raise real incomes in the economy and then restore equality between 
the DRS and DRT. This analysis is one of the few instances where economic 
theory has seriously saught to explain the prevalence of both import substitu-
ting industrialization and subsidies on such production. Yet both types of 
trade interventions have been strongly followed in LDCs, notwithstanding their 
discouragement under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade - GATT. 
There are several arguments to explain LDCs import substituting 
and export promotion measures which are bcth disallowed by the free-trade-
leaning GATT. One view traces the import-substituting industrialization of 
LDCs to the fall in the value of exports of primary commodities, particularly 
during the ';dirty thirties" of the depression. This decrease in export values 
produced chronic shortages in foreign exchange and a fall in the ability of 
LDCs to import manufactures from HDCs. In this argument, import-substituting 
industrialization is cast as a move towards autarky. 
Other arguments put forward for industrialization in LDCs articulate 
the existence of external economies otherwise assumed away under free trade 
conditions. These external economies envisage the concommitant benefits to 
be derived in industrialization from technical progress and innovation. 
A major devise in LDCs industrialization processes has been import 
restriction. The popularity of this devise arose from its ease of application 
for multiple purposes. Less known are the distortionary effects of import 
restrictions on domestic factor prices, sectoral resource allocation, and the 
fact that import restriction at once entails a tax on all sectors of the economy 
not affected by the restriction. This is so because the restrictions shift 
relative prices in favour of the restricted products. In the industrialization 
process this shift redistributes income to projected industries and away from 
tho se that are not protected. Antiprotected industries are inevitably the 
export producers and particularly, agriculture. This is the source of worsening 
terms of trade between agriculture and industry, making for the greater attrac-
tiveness of investments (in terms of both capital and labor) into the latter 
sector. 
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It can be shown that a great number of the problems related to un-
employment, the rural-urban wage differential and excess capacity in manufac-
turing, correspond to shifts in income distribution and relative prices brought 
about by import restrictions, Although these problems have become critical 
in most LDCs, import controls have persisted and even been strengthened in 
some cases. 
One explanation of the persistence of trade intervening measures 
is that they provide, (in the case of tariffs) a relatively easy form of 
taxation to collect. In inducing the industrialization process, import 
restrictions lend themselves to a wide range of attractive incentives for 
both domestic and foreign investors. High rates of return are provided 
through restrictions on imports of commodities produced by the import-sub-
stituting sector. These high rates of return redistribute incomes, so that, 
through high rates of financial profit, an increasing proportion of total 
saving in the economy accrues in the industrial sector. The reasoning behind 
this redistribution is that higher savings in the hands of those most likely 
to invest also implies higher rates of capital accumulation. However, this 
often is an untruth where those domestic investors earning high profits 
dissipate investment potential through (a) improvements in their standards 
of living which often mean higher imports, and (b) acquisitions which involve 
the transfer of already - existing assets. Thus in LDCs, the highest-saving 
groups are not also necessarily the best placed groups in investing savings. 
Where foreign investors are given the import-restriction facilities of 
increasing their savings, the problem of these savings being translated into 
expanded investment is often aggravated by remittances and transfer pricing. 
. Another aspect of import restrictions is their ability to curve out 
an already established domestic market for domestic producers, through the • 
displacement of imports. The adverse effects on consumers' welfare are of 
course, that the substitution of imports with domestic production under import 
restrictions involves losses in consumers' surplus for every restricted 
commodity, and invariably introduces market imperfections in the market for 
the commodities involved. 
There are several ways in which import restrictions are applied on 
trade with varying effects on consumers, producers and government tax revenues. 
Firstly, imports may be restricted by .applying a tariff which raises the 
domestic price of a given importable above world price by a component equal 
to the world price times the ad-valorem tariff rate. 
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In the absence of domestic production, fixed exchange rates and 
given world prices, for the taxed commodity, prices in the domestic market 
rise by the exact amount of the tariff. The real income of consumer's is 
reduced in proportion to consumer spending on taxed commodities in exactly the 
same way as domestic indirect taxes do. There are some exceptions which are 
of relevance to LDCs. In the case where the exchange rate is flexible, for 
instance, the reduced imports exert an upward influence on the foreign exchange 
value of a country's currency. For every unit of the country's currency a 
greater quantity of importables is obtained than before the tariff imposition. 
Conversely, for every unit of currency earned by domestic exporters, less of 
exports are sold, dissipating the country's competitive position abroad. This 
mechanism has a parallel in the frequently overvalued currencies of LDCs which 
affect imports and exports in exactly the same manner. There are some compelling 
2 reasons for currency overvaluation in LDCs however. 
In the case where a country successfully introduces the domestic 
production of importables through tariff protection, domestic prices and "home" 
supply will rise along the domestic supply curve without revenue yield for 
the government on the home-produced quantity. The tariff "burden" to consumers 
is then no longer a share in the costs of government. It becomes a loss in 
real incomes to consumers, emanating from a loss in the efficiency of resource 
utilization. 
A second form of import restriction is import licensing which affects 
domestic prices in a similar manner to a tariff. However, the higher price of 
importables accrues to the licence holders. It does not in this instance, 
yield government revenue. 
Thirdly, administrative controls can be applied in various forms. 
The most common form of administrative control is the rationing of foreign 
exchange. Besides raising domestic prices in a similar manner to tariffs and 
quotas, administrative controls encourage inefficient utilization of capital 
among LDCs manufacturers through increases in the marginal capital/output ratio. 
This increment implies that for a given output, higher precautionary stocks 
are held in inventory. Imported-input using manufacturers, anticipating lags 
in foreign exchange allocations, hold higher quantities of the inputs for any 
2. A well known reason is the inelastic demand facing producers of 
primary commodities in world markets. 
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given flow of output. Their capital investments are thus higher, for any 
given output, than would be the case in the absence of foreign exchange 
rationing. Nor would this inefficiency be resolved if imported-input using 
manufacturer s-Vabstained from hoarding- Delays in obtaining foreign exchange 
lead to slowdowns in domestic production, excess capacity in the affected firms, 
higher domestic prices, lower employment and a diminution in domestic backward 
linkages. It is clear that foreign exchange controls, originally introduced to 
combat Worsening balance of payments problems in LDCs, have become a major form 
of control of domestic production and investment. 
II 
The Kenyan Case: 
(A) TARIFFS 
All of. the three main forms of trade restriction described in section 
I have been applied in Kenya over a long period. We studied an eight year 
period, 1967-1973, to see the trend, takenrin tariff protection, import restric-
tions and corrective measures to encourage exports. No information was avail-
able on foreign exchange, .allocations. The level of disaggregation in tariff 
impositions, increments, reductions or eliminations was such that no'systematic 
analysis by S.I.T.C. classes was possible. Moreover, tariffs were found to 
converge with import licencing on certain commodities and to be the sole trade 
intervention measure in other .cases. In both instances no information was 
available on the third measure of restriction, foreign exchange allocations 
although there appears to be a relationship between foreign exchange holdings 
for 1966-1975 and the application of interventionist measures. 
One. of the simplest relationships one can attempt to establish between 
the tariff changes overtime and changes in import substituting domestic produc-
tion can take the following form. 
(1) Sit/Qit r a Tit^e 
•L•: - i = 1, 2,- -8. 
where Sit is the mean domestic production in STTC class i, (at 2 or 3 digit 
level,) during.year.t, Qit is the mean total quantity demanded domestically 
of commodities in class, i during year t, Tit is the mean tariff rate ruling 
at year t on the importation of commodities in class i , and e is a multipli-
cative error term. 
7 -
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It is understood that, since mean total quantity demanded Qit is 
the sum of mean of total domestic production. Sit, and imports, the left hand 
term of (1) measures the ability of the growth of domestic production to fill 
in domestic demand: over time, all other things equal. Equation (1) can be 
transformed into 
(2) log Sit - log Qit = log a + B log Tit + log e, which can be 
3 
fitted. In this simple case, parameter^ would indicate the weighted mean 
of the elasticity of the domestic contribution to total domestic demand with 
respect to the tariff rates, for all eight classes of the SITC. 
IMPORT LICENSING 
Import licensing in Kenya is legally provided for in the Import, 
Export and Essential Supplies Act. Cap.502 and Legal Notice No.348 of 1968. 
The latter provision was aimed at increasing the proportion of total imports 
channeled into the domestic market through indegenous traders via the KNTC. 
For the period.examined in this paper, there appears to be a fairly-
close correspondence between Kenya's foreign exchange holdings and measures 
taken to curb the flow of imports. According to table 1 and diagram 1, the 
periods 1967-1968, 1970-1971, and 1973-1975, show marked crises in foreign 
exchange holdings. In facing the repeated crises in foreign exchange reserves, 
the policies followed appear to have been aimed at (a) curbing the importation 
of items in the current account of the balance of payments, and (b) increasing 
the incentives of domestic producers to export. 
The periods mentioned above coincided with intensified application 
3. It is important to note the assumptions made concerning the least squares 
estimator for g. This may clarify the need for other adjustments required on the 
dependent variable before the estimator' can be expected to be significant. 
Firstly, the dependent variable is a ratio between mean domestic supply Sit and 
mean domestic demand Qit, for SITC classes i=l,2, 8, Both domestic supply and 
demand are unadjusted for the relevant commodity price elasticities. This assumes 
that all domestic supply and demand responds to tariffs (through their responses 
to prices) at the same rate. This is not true in economic theory. Important factors, 
such as substitutability, in the case of Qit', will determine the/price elasticity 
of each commodity. For all eight classes of the SITC, we would then have two vectors 
Esi, Edi, i=l,2, 8 corresponding to the mean price elasticity of supply and mean 
price elasticity of demand respectively.. One- of the ways of adjusting the dependent 
variable to reflect the price elasticities is to weight Sit and Qit with Esi and 
Edi respectively, This does not, however, solve the problem completely. Relative : 
prices change over time, and the data observations are likely to refer to disequili-
brium positions because of lags in the adjustment process, especially in domestic 
production. Technological change will also affect Sit and Qit will change as 
tastes change. 
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of the government's import-curtailment-export-promotion strategy. Foreign 
exchange holdings seem to have improved somewhat except for the period 1973-
5 
1975 when holdings generally declined from the record levels of 1972 . We 
now examine the forms in which the above trade intervention policies are 
applied. 
For the purposes of import restriction, all tradable commodities 
are classified into three schedules. 
Schedule..!: Commodities originating outside of the East African 
Community, whose importation into Kenya is prohibited without an import 
licence. 
Schedule 2: Commodities originating from any country whose importa-
tion into Kenya without an import licence is prohibited. 
Schedule 3: Commodities originating from the East African Community 
which may not be imported into Kenya Save through the Kenya National Trading 
Corporation. 
Table 1: KENYA: Foreign Exchange Reserves: Quarterly Holdings: 1967-1975 
K. Sh. Million 
March June Sept. Dec. 
1966 837.2 
196 882.6 872.7 903.0 630.8 
1968 718.3 764.5 823.6 859.0 
1969 1044.1 1098.5 1252.0 1302.2 
1970 1494.0 1451.0 1559.7 1682.5 
1971 1768.0 1502.0 1294.0 1255.2 
1972 1348.0 1246.0 1358.4 1443.0 
1973 1679.2 2017.0 1942.0 1639.0 
1974 1752.0 1501.4 1271.3 1302.0 
1975 1589.4 1373.3 1172.1 1380.0 
37 Observations 
on Foreign Exchange Reserves. 
Source: ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REVIEW 
CENTRAL BANK OF KENYA: VARIOUS ISSUES 
For 1967-1968 See for instance, L.N. 1 and L.N. 2 of Jan.3,1967, 
L.N. 62 of March 10, 1967, L.N. 115 of June 9, 1967, L.N. 162 of July 29, 
1967, L.N. 193 of Sept.15, 1967, L.N. 17 of Feb.21, 1968, L.N. 281, of Sept. 
13, 1968, L.N. 1 of Jan.3, 1968, L.N. 33 of Feb.2, 1968 and L.N. 268 of 
Aug.23, 1968. 
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Quantitative restrictions (or QRs) in Kenya, effectively mean the 
inclusion of commodities in one or more of the above Schedules. These schedules 
are changed from time to time, increasing the restrictions or liberalizing 
trade somewhat. Removal from or inclusion of commodities in the schedules is 
effected through the publication of Legal Notices in the Kenya Gazette. 
Regardless of the schedule in which a given restricted commodity is 
gazetted, the Director of Commerce and Industry may, in his absolute discretion 
decline to issue an import licence although appeals may be made to the Minister 
for Commerce and Industry. The Minister is empowered to prohibit, restrict or 
remove restriction on the importation of any commodity. 
EXPORT PROMOTION 
There are various interventionist measures taken by the government 
to affect the costs of production in industry. These take the form of duty 
drawbacks on imported inputs or duty remissions. The decision to grant duty 
drawbacks or remissions is based on the alternative uses of the imported input. 
If encouragement of an industry requires lower domestic input costs and the 
input (when imported,) has no alternative domestic uses, the practice is to 
grant duty remission at the point of importation. When the imported input has 
alternative domestic uses, however, encouragement of the user industry requires 
that evidence of imported-input content of the finished product be produced 
before a duty drawback is granted- Rates of duty remission or drawbacks vary 
from less - than r'10% to 100%. 
Import duty remissions and duty drawbacks are not, however handled 
under the same law or government ministries. The Local Industries (Refund of 
Customs Duties) Act authorizes the Minister for Commerce and Industry to refund 
certain duties paid on imported inputs. Recipients of duty drawbacks must be 
"approved" industries under a Legal Notice and may or may not receive the refund 
on "exported quantities only". 
Duty remissions are authorized under the Customs Tariff Act by the 
Minister for Finance and Planning, and automatically permit the importer to 
receive the imported input free of duty, or at partial duty remission, as 
specified by L.N. For the period studied, it was observed that the Tariff Act 
has frequently been used to reduce the costs of setting up joint ventures 
5. The correlation between improvements in foreign reserve holdings and 
the use of government intervention is not so straight forward when the effects 
of the business cycle on primary commodity exports and prices are taken into 
account. 
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between the government, (or government parastatal bodies), and foreign or 
6 ' domestic investors. It is not often appreciated that, whenever other 
firms exist in a given industry, the encouragement of a particular venture 
through cost reductions is discriminatory. When the new firm captures a 
sizeable shape of the market, after official encouragement, commodity market 
imperfections may be generated, with the implications that domestic supply 
of the commodity will incur greater resource costs and also a loss in consumers' 
surplus. 
Where the encouragement of local industry is effected through cost 
reductions, there are several features which distinguish import duty remissions 
from import duty refunds. Except in the case where import duty remissions 
impose monopoly powers in the commodity markets, it iseems more likely that 
cost reductions in this case may be transmitted to consumers in lower prices. 
It is also clear that the more intensively the industry granted the remission 
uses imported inputs, the greater will be the price reductions for consumers. 
A macroeconomic corollary of this boom to consumers, however, is that the 
tariff (which is remitted), granted to domestic producers of the intermediate 
goods tends to redundancy as their production becomes "unprotected". Less 
intensive users of imported inputs are unlikely to operate at much lower costs 
or sell at lower prices after duty remissions. Domestic producers of inputs 
for these industries will hence be generally less "unprotected". 
There are reasons to believe that cost reductions on inputs or the 
attendant commodity price reductions likely to occur when duty remission is 
granted, are less likely to occur when producers are granted refunds on 
imported inputs after the incorporation of these inputs in the finished 
commodities. The administrative procedures for obtaining refunds of duty on 
imported inputs is complex, creating uncertainty in the producer's decision-
making. The period of our observations revealed numerous cases where the re-
funds were authorized under Legal Notice several months after the effective date 
6, See, for instance, L.N. 243 of Dec.1, 1973 with respect to Chemelil 
Sugar Co. and Mumias'Sugar Co.; Cadbury Schweppes Kenya Ltd. , Messrs Chui Enter-
prises; Kenya Fishnet Industries Ltd; Messrs Pigeon Slide Works. L.N.34 of Feb. 
25, 1975 with respect to 4 companies, including Pan African Paper Mills which 
has part ICDC ownership. L.N.124 of June 16,1972 with respect to a Steelworks 
Company, Emco Steelworks, Kenya Ltd. 
7. See L.N. 77 of April 28, 1972 effective date Jan.l, 1972, L.N. 61-of 
March 30, 1972 effective date Jan.l, 1972, L.N. 89 of May 12, 1972, effective 
date Jan. 21, 1972. ' 
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Apart from time lapses of the above kind, the administrative 
machinery for the lodging and. authorization of refunds is both complex and 
time-consuming.^ It is therefore inconceivable that, with the uncertainty 
involved, a producer is able to make production decisions which take account 
of the lower costs expected from an import drawback scheme. In order for 
lower input costs to accrue to the producers and lower commodity prices to 
be transmitted to the consumer, the import duties would have to be "drawnback" 
in time for each production period to reflect the increased competitiveness. 
A special feature of the .import drawback scheme in Kenya is its 
constant use in encouraging domestic producers to venture .into export markets. 
This will be analysed more formally in Section III. Many producers are granted 
9 
import duty refunds on intermediate, inputs in ''exported quantities only". 
But where there are administrative lags in the granting of the drawbacks, it 
must be expected that the shot in the arm for Kenya's exports may often turn 
out to be a shot too late. The importance of time in this case is that late ' 
refunds for both domestic and exported quantities of a given commodity under the 
drawback scheme may be absorbed by the producer as additions to net profits 
rather than cost reductions. Even if a perfect administrative system were 
designed and the producers received their drawbacks on imported inputs in time 
to incorporate them into each production period, the scheme would still dis-
criminate on two levels, 
Firstly, established exporting firms which are also more intensive 
users of imported inputs would experience a shift in their export supply curves 
further to the right than "beginning" exporters who were not intensive users 
of imported inputs. Secondly, refunds on imported inputs encourage the domestic 
firms to import their materials rather than expand "import-substituted" back-
ward linkages. That is, domestic producers of inputs granted the drawbacks 
will be discouraged. Where the refunds are on "exported quantities only", 
then they will be discouraged from domestically supplying that proportion of 
their total supply which would otherwise go into exportable production. 
8. This has been shown before by R.C. Porter, "Kenya's Future as an 
Exporter of Manufactures"- Eastern Africa Economic Review, Vol. 6 #1, June 
1974. 
9. For 1971, See E.N. 29 of Feb. 19, L.N. 9 of Jan.15, L.N. 48 of March 
19, L.N. 85; 86; 87 of April 23, L.N. 230 of Oct. 23, L.N. 135 of July 2. 
12 -
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There are two aspects of the drawback on exportables which should 
make policy-makers more wary of the effects of the simple subsidy. The problem 
of over-invoicing is now well known. To the extent that there is over-invoicing 
of imports, intensive users of the imported inputs who'are permitted to drawback 
their import duties on inputs into subsequently exported quantities can reduce 
by 
their domestic costs/wider margins than (a) exporters who are less intensive 
users of imported inputs and (b) smaller domestic producers who have not 
generated the capacity to expert. 
The second aspect concerns the overvaluation of currency. If the 
Kenya shilling is over-valued, the granting of drawbacks on exported quantities 
creates a "stick-and-the-carrot" phenomenon in the perceptions of exporters. 
Overvalued currencies (v/hich few countries ever escape from time to time), 
mean undervalued imports. That is it looks cheaper to domestic manufacturers 
(including exporters,) to buy their inputs abroad, regardless of the drawbacks 
granted-on import duties. In the event of currency overvaluation it also, 
conversely, looks harder for1 domestic producers to venture into export markets, 
especially in non-traditional exports such as manufactures. The high domestic 
prices of manufactures guaranteed by protection create export pessimism and 
make foreign producers look more competitive than-they really are. 
Ill 
One of the points raised repeatedly in this paper is that a tariff 
on imports, or equivalent intervention constitutes a tax on exports and other 
domestic sectors of the economy. It takes only a little analysis to establish 
the symmetry between import taxes and export taxes. r 
Suppose a tariff X% was imposed on imports. This raises the domestic 
price of importables to Pw(l + x), where Pw is the world price of imports. Thus, 
the relative domestic price of imports to exports rises by a margin of (1 + x), 
drawing resources into the production of importables and increasing the incomes 
of factors employed in the production of importables. Suppose on the other 
hand an export tax of the same margin X% was imposed on exports. This lowers 
the relative domestic pr'ice of exports by a margin l/(l+x), giving rise to the 
same resource allocation impact as in the case of a tax on imports. 
The above outcome implies the following. To reverse the bias created 
by import tariffs against domestic exports, a subsidy to exports, equal to the 
tariffs, would be required. Such a subsidy restores the pre-intervention price 
ratio between imports and exports in the domestic market. 
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The intervention picture in Kenya is complex. For the period 
s 
analysed, numerous cases v;6re found where QR are combined with tariff protec-
tion and both in turn combined with drawback schemes on imported tariff 
10 
protected inputs. The following is a limited analysis of the variant out-
comes in income distribution, resource allocation and the abilities of 
domestic manufacturers to export their products under the drawback scheme. 
It is assumed that there are no time lags in the ability of producers to adjust 
to lower input costs resulting from government policies. That is cost-reducing 
measures aimed at promoting exports and expanding domestic production, among 
other objectives, automatically appear on the supply curve of the'affected 
industry. 
Only four cases are selected for detailed analysis although this 
does not exhaust the outcomes of possible combinations in interventionist 
policies. The four cases are the following: 
(A) Tariff ridden input-output prices, the monopolist and export 
promotion. 
(B) Tariff protection vs quantitative restriction, tariff ridden 
inputs and competitive industry. 
(C) Quofa-equivalent tariff protection, the monopolist and 
tariff ridden .input prices. , 
(D) Tariff ridden input prices, thenmonopolist and quantitative 
restriction. 
(A) 
Consider the case where domestic production of an-importable is 
initially set up under a monopoly which sells to the ^ domestic market with 
imports of the commodity banned. There is no dearth of import substituting 
industries of this nature in LDCs. Supposing now that after capturing the 
domestic market, the industry is given incentives by the government to come 
out of infancy and export some of its output. Even if the firm responded 
favourably to incentives and commenced exportation, we would expect it to 
retain its monopoly on domestic sales. Designating domestic sales with Q, 
and exports with Q2, the total product of the industry, Q, would be 
(3) Q = Q] + Q2 
10. A few examples ore illustrative of this complexity. 
(1) Chewing gum:.., Quota: L.N. 11 of Jan. 15, 1975, Drawback, L.N. # 135 of 2nd 
July, 1971. 
(2) Socks: Quota: L-N.98 of June 8, 1970, Drawbacks" L.N.ff 9 of Jan.15, 1971 
(3) Bicycle tyres & tubes: Quota: L.N.98 of June 8, 1970, Drawbacks L.N.tf 172 
of 20th Aug. 1971. 
(4) Woolen fabrics: Quota: L.N.98 of June 8,1970 Drawbacks L.N.172 of 20th Aug'71. 
(5) Trousers Quota: L.N.98 of June 8,1970 " " 197 " 21st Sept'72. 
(6) Paper products Quota: L.N. " " 
All of the above products are also tariff protected. 
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The monopolist maximizes his profit (IT) where first order conditions 
are fulfilled, 
(4) 3n _ _8tt_ 
9Q1 " BQ2 
The profits to be maximized are equal to the total revenue from domestic sales 
P^Q^ plus the revenue from export sales P2Q2 ^-ess the cos"t of production C(Q). 
(5) t\ - P1Q1 + P2Q2 - C(Q). 
Denoting the domestic and foreign revenues with R^ and R2 respectively, and 
differentiating the profit function with respect to both Q^ and Q^, we have 
(6) 9TT 3R. _ 3C 
a v " 9 Q * 
8R2 3C _ 
8Q2~ 9Q2. ' 3Q " 
The equality of marginal revenues in equations (6) does not however, imply 
equality of prices in the two markets. Given the monopolist reaps monopoly 
profits in the domestic market, but-faces a perfectly competitive export 
market, all that equations (6) imply is that the marginal revenue in each 
market must equal the common marginal cost of the output as a whole. Since 
the marginal revenue in the export market will equal export price and domestic 
price exceed domestic marginal revenue then the domestic price will be higher 
than export price. Using an alternative definition for marginal revenue in 
a monopoly (6) can be writen as 
(7) MR. = P {1-1 1 n^ 9Q 
MR = P = 3C 
9Q-
where TI is the price, elasticity of domestic demand. An important rule emerges 
in the pricing and production of exports. From (6) and (7) it is clear that 
regardless of price differentials between the monopolist's domestic and export 
markets, the production of the exportable proportion of any industry should 
be priced at marginal cost. 
Let us now examine diagramatically, how a monopolist, contrasted 
with a perfectly competitive industry, responds to different levels of tariff 
intervention in the commodity and input markets. 
15 -
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. In Figure -1, P2 = Fw(l + t) where t is the tariff rate on commodity 
imports and Pw is the world price. Pc is the competitive price of the commodity 
domestically. : Suppose that tariff t is sufficient to exclude all imports of 
the commodity. Then, P^ A, the total domestic production^is the same whether 
under monopoly or perfect competition. For the perfect competitor however 
the limiting price is P0 where P B is supplied to the domestic market and BA 
exported, 11 But the monopolist will segment his market and restrict domestic 
supply to OQm sold at price P^. The presence of monopoly and a closed domestic 
1 
market transfers incomes to the tune of P2CDP2 from consumers to the producers 
and the loss in consumer's surplus is DCB. The monopolist, however, exports 
quantity CA which is CB greater than that exported under perfect . competition 
although he faces anti-damping rules in his foreign markets. 
Consider now the case where the authorities wish to remove the 
monopoly power of the industry domestically, returning income P2CDP2 to consumers 
but not jeorpadizing the export performance of the monopolist. Suppose a small 
downward adjustment in tlv tariff t, ceases to exclude imports. Market segmenta-
tion is no longer possible. If the monopolist sets a price just below the 
tariff inclusive price, he will not only be able to exclude imports as effectively 
as before, but he still exports BA of his output without contravening anti-damping 
11. In a common market like East Africa, exports of BA could be sold by 
the least cost producer to othe^ members!so that the common tariff promotes 
exports to the common market rather than to the rest of the world, see"the 
argument by R.C. Porter, ibid., on this class of exports from Kenya. To. the 
extent that rising supply curves mean rising costs in this and the following 
diagrams depicting monopoly, it.-also implies monopsony:power for the monopolist. 
16 -
IDS/WP 281 
rules. Exports are reduced by CB which is transferred to the domestic market, 
and consumer's surplus increases by DCB. The monopolist behaves exactly like 
a perfect competitor in his pricing, domestic supply and export performance. 
Supposing now that the authorities wish to give incentives to the 
monopolist so that he can restore CB (or more) exports. One way of doing this 
may be to devise cost reducing measures which affect the monopolist's input 
markets. Such measures will shift MC^ to MC^, increasing exports to Ba\ Note 
that now, unless the authorities wish to maintain the tariff for revenue 
purposes, the tariff could be removed and yet leave the country a net exporter 
(quantity EE'1") at world price, regardless of whether domestic production is 
under monopoly or perfect competition. 
The above shows that the closing of the domestic market under 
monopoly releases low- cost exports but at the expense of a redistribution 
of income from consumers to producers and a loss in consumer's surplus. But 
higher exports may be generated (without redistributing incomes from consumers 
to producers) through cost reducing incentives to producers. Furthermore 
such measures may enable the authorities to gradually reduce tariff protection 
while leaving the country a net exporter of the commodity. 
Figure 2, 
pYice 
Pw(Ht) 
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In figure 2, Pw is the world price of the commodity which is produced 
in a competitive domestic market. Tariff t, raises the domestic price to Pw(l+t) 
which increases domestic production from OG to OH with RQ of domestic consumption 
being filled in with imports. A quota which permits RQ of imports will have an 
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equivalent effect on domestic prices to the tariff, t, without yielding 
government revenue. In both cases, resources EFHG are drawn from other sectors 
of the economy into the tariff-distorted production of the import-competing 
commodity. 
Let us now examine the effects of granting lower input prices to 
producers through measures such as import duty drawbacks. In the case of tariff 
protection, the shift in the marginal cost curve does not affect price. Greater 
1 1 
domestic resources, HFF H , are bid away from the rest of the economy into the 
production of the commodity, and lower cost imports are curtailed further from 
RQ to NQ. 
In the case of a quota, similar cost-reducing measures will result in 
lower domestic prices although domestic production will not increase by as much 
as it does in the presence of tariffs. The domestic price increasing effect 
of the quota is, in this instance, dissipated somewhat as greater domestic 
production occurs with no change in imports i.e, dM^O. There is thus a 
redistribution from producers to consumers and a smaller resource-allocational 
distortion from the economy as a whole to the high cost import-competing 
production of the commodity. We thus conclude that for income distribution 
and greater efficiency in resource allocation, cost-reducing measures for a 
competitive industry will be more effective if imports are constant, dM=0, 
than if quota-equivalent tariff protection is accorded to the industry initially. 
(C) 
Suppose now that the domestic industry in case (E) is a monopoly 
operating against an import quota, dM=6. Fig. 3 shows that the demand curve 
faced by the-monopolist will be quota-distorted and horizontal to the true 
domestic demand curve. The monopolist becomes only a dominant supplier to 
the domestic market. 
In Fig. 3, let AB be the importable quota. If AR is the domestic 
demand curve, then the monopolist faces a quota-distorted demand curve ARq 
and he is a dominant supplier in the domestic market. He equates marginal 
cost with marginal revenue and charges price Pq at which quantity OQq is sold 
domestically and.supplemented with equal-priced imports of AB. 
A. tariff can be devised to induce the monopolist to supply the product 
competitively domestically against his quota-distorted demand curve, while imports 
equivalent to the quota continue to enter the domestic market. Such a tariff, t, 
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Figure 3. 
raises domestic price above world price Pw to Pt and the monopolist' faces a 
kinked remand curve P A1B1AR. The flat portion P A1!?1 coincides with the 
t 1 
marginal revenue, MR . The monopolist now produces P^A corresponding to the 
intersection of MR^ and MC and competes perfectly with imports which enter 
the domestic market at the same price. 
Under the tariff, the monopolist produces QA"'" which he would not 
produce under a quota and he further foregoes monopoly profits PqAQPt which 
he would reap under the quota. Triangle AQA1 is a transfer (consumer's surplus) 
from the monopolist and licence holders to the consumers, effected through the 
use of the tariff rather than a quota. A tariff is clearly superior to a quota 
in curtailing both the monopoly power of domestic producers and the financial 
profits of importers. 
Suppose now that after the curtailment of monopoly power the govern-
ment wishes to encourage expanded production by granting input cost reducing 
measures to the monopolist. The new marginal cost is Mc\ Provided that 
imports are kept constant, dM=0, it is clear that the tariff inclusive domestic 
price will decrease while yielding expanded production. The price of imports 
will similarly be forced down to the new level "'"P and there is thus a transfer 
from the profits of importers to consumers. 
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Domestic production is, however, greater under a tariff, P^b, and imports are 
curtailed to bB without a domestic price reduction for the commodity. With 
imports constant, d.M=0, and input cost reductions, domestic production is 
P^ _a < P^b, but domestic price is lower, "^ P^  < P^. 
Finally, we consider the case where the import quota with which the 
monopolist competes is maintained v/hile input cost reducing measures are 
granted. In Fig.4, the monopolist is faced with a quota-distorted demand 
curve. He adjusts production to the point where his MR intersects the MC 
and sells OQq at price Pq, the balance of domestic demand being filled with 
imports of RS at the same price. 
1 
Cost reductions which shift the marginal cost to MC will similarly 
reduce/increase the monopolist's price/domestic production, and also reduce 
the price of imports. There is a transfer from the monopolist and import 
licence holders to consumers and increased lower-cost domestic production. 
The new domestic px-ice of imports and domestic production is OP^ and OQ 
Figure 
To summarize the cases of Kenya's trade intervention examined, case 
(A) indicates that production by a domestic monopolist for a closed market 
redistributes incomes from consumers to the monopolist and bids away resources 
from other sectors of the economy to the inefficient monopolist. A domestic 
market closed to perfect competitors, however, while not similarly redistributing 
incomes from consumers to producers, similarly bids away resources from other 
sectors of the economy and generates lower exports than a monopoly. Tariff 
adjustment downwards may equate the behaviour of a monopolist to that of a 
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perfect competitor. A monopolist stripped of monopoly power by tariff adjust-
ment will respond to measures which reduce costs by increasing exports in a 
similar manner to a perfect competitor. 
Case (B) indicates that cost reducing measures will make domestic 
production more competitive when an import quota is used and maintained, than 
when a quota-equivalent tariff is in force. In both cases domestic production 
increases but more so under the tariff than under a quota, while domestic 
price decreases under a quota. 
Case (C) shows that under a monopoly, a tariff is superior to a quota 
in ridding the monopolist of monopoly power under which he exacts monopoly 
profits from consumers at a price also charged by licence holding importers. 
The switch from a quota to a tariff, when further accompanied by cost reducing 
measures and constancy of imports ensures lower domestic prices and greater 
production while the removal of the condition dM=0 increases domestic production, 
leaves domestic price unchanged but curtails imports. 
Case (D) analyses the case where the monopolist's quota-distorted 
production and relevant commodity price are not corrected with a quota-equivalent 
tariff, but input cost reducing measures are granted. It is seen that price/ 
domestic production will decrease/increase, but the element of income distribu-
tion from consumers to the monopolist (in monopoly profits) and licence holders 
continues. 
The cases examined .indicate some of the effects of Kenya's policy 
combinations in trade intervention. Further research of industries which fit 
the categories analysed will verify the theoretical effects and indicate 
corrective measures which should be persued towards resource allocation, export 
promotion and income distribution. 

